And it is obvious also that only the thing, or to put it more metaphysically, the individual, fulfils this condition. Now in the case of those existences which, in being experienced, do not for practical purposes depend upon the apprehension of a lower type of object upon which they are based, which we may (again only for practical purposes) consider only as object it is evident that this doubleness of aspect may be neglected. Everything that is, in so far as it is for us, is on one side experience, on the other side object, and these two aspects can never be reduced to one. I propose that what we actually get is different types of objects. You cannot, that is, without an arbitrary fiat, treat the relations as the extension of the relata, or concepts as propositional functions. In this world of symbols, all objects are of the same type in the real world, objects are of different types so far as they are in practice treated as being such. R=ab(a +b)), such definitions not being asserted and not being true or false. It is only applicable in the abstract world in which all terms are taken in extension (cf. 1It is obvious that much that we ordinarily call definition will not fall under this account. Russell’s definition of definition: definition signifies that a symbol just introduced is identical in meaning with a more complicated symbol previously used. The difficulties of definition are occasioned by the fact that every definition is relative to a point of view, and it is only when and where differences of point of view are negligible that we can be said to have an adequate definition. is the fifth of six surviving essays that Eliot wrote in the 1914 Michaelmas term for his tutorial with Joachim. In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:
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